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State trading enterprises (STEs) are widely used by many significant exporters and importers of 
agricultural commodities including, inter alia, Canada, Australia, Japan, South Korea and India, 
as well as by many other, though smaller, participants in agricultural trade. Added to this list is 
China which has a long history in the use of state trading to manage both agricultural imports 
and exports with the aim of meeting the domestic objectives of the Chinese government. In this 
context, seen as an instrument of agricultural policy, state trading is no different from the use of 
alternative measures of intervention in the agricultural sector that have been pursued by most 
countries around the world, including OECD countries. However, in recent years, state trading 
has been placed on the agenda of the current World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Round 
negotiations with an explicit attempt made to deal with state trading enterprises in exporting 
countries. In addition, across many countries, the role of state trading has been part of the 
domestic  reform  agenda  with  de-regulation  of  STEs  being  pursued  in  both  developed  and 
developing countries. However, in most cases, the de-regulation of state trading has involved 
reducing  the  role  that  STEs  play  in  the  domestic  and  international  markets  rather  than 
removing them outright. Examples of this process of (partial) de-regulation include Australia, 
Japan and Indonesia among others. 
It is in this overall context that we analyze the role of state trading in China. State trading, 
principally in the form of the China National Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs Import and Export 
Company (COFCO), has been the main mechanism through which the State Development and 
Planning  Commission  (SDPC)  sought  to  achieve  a  balance  between  supply  and  demand  in 
domestic markets for many agricultural commodities. While the state also played an important 
role in the domestic procurement and marketing of domestically produced commodities, with 
respect to international markets, COFCO had exclusive rights to import grains (wheat, maize 
and rice) and, to a lesser extent, vegetable oils (soybean, palm, canola and mustard) and sugar, 
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However, reflecting developments elsewhere, the role of state trading in China has both 
changed and, with China‘s accession to the WTO in 2001, the pressure for further reform has 
also increased. First, on the domestic front, since the mid-1990s, the role of the state in the 
procurement and marketing of key agricultural commodities has undergone important reforms 
that  have  allowed  increased  competition  in  the  domestic  market.  As  we  discuss  below, 
developments in the domestic market are important for assessing the impact of state trading on 
international markets. Second, while domestic de-regulation largely left the exclusive rights of 
COFCO over imports and exports untouched, the role of state trading in international markets 
was a key issue in China‘s accession to the WTO in 2001. Although the Accession Protocol 
confirmed the continuing existence of COFCO, part of the negotiations on China‘s accession 
were aimed largely at tempering the impact of COFCO on world markets. By and large, the 
principal  means  to  achieve  this  outcome  was  to  permit  a  greater  role  for  private  firms  to 
compete  over  imports  by  restricting  the  share  of  the  TRQ  that  could  be  accounted  for  by 
COFCO.  
In  general  terms,  the  overall  concern  with  the  use  of  state  trading  enterprises  as  a 
mechanism of government policy, is two-fold.  First, from an international perspective, state 
trading acts in a manner similar to other but more transparent policy instruments in that it 
inhibits market access and unfairly increases competition on export markets. In other words, 
STEs act in a manner similar to import tariffs and export subsidies. Second, with respect to the 
issue of de-regulation, increasing the role of the private sector is perceived to be desirable as a 
means to increase welfare. Put differently, even if the STE remains in some form and even if it 
retains its exclusive rights in some markets (say for example over imports while it is excluded 
from procurement in the domestic market), the increased competitiveness in the procurement 
and marketing of agricultural commodities would be welfare enhancing. By and large, research 
that has formally addressed these issues has been thin, even though they are important issues in 
the context of the WTO reforms and domestically on de-regulation in both developed countries 
(e.g. Australia and Japan) and developing/emerging economies (e.g. India and China). In a 
series  of  recent  papers,  we  have  analyzed  several  of  these  issues  covering  both  the  trade 
distorting aspects of STEs and the welfare consequences of the partial de-regulation of state 
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The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the potential impact of COFCO on agricultural 
markets  by  drawing  on  this  recent  research.  The  chapter  is  organized  as  follows.  First,  we 
summarize the key factors that determine the trade distorting effect of STEs on international 
markets. We also analyze the possibility that partial de-regulation of state trading enterprises 
may not necessarily be welfare enhancing. Second, we review the major developments relating 
to the role of the state in domestic markets and trade covering both the major domestic reforms 
since the late 1990s and the accession of China to the WTO in 2001. Third, we draw on more 
recent research to evaluate the potential impact of COFCO on international markets. Finally, we 
summarize and conclude. 
Recent Research on the Economic Effects of STEs 
Despite the prominent role played by STEs in agricultural trade, the analysis of state trading 
beyond describing and summarizing the extent of state trading (or the focus on specific STEs 
such as the Canadian Wheat Board) is largely underdeveloped. As such, even though state 
trading as a negotiating issue has arisen in the current WTO round, and de-regulation of state 
marketing authorities has been undertaken across many (particularly developing) countries and 
continues to be part of the domestic debate on de-regulation, few insights have emerged from 
academic research on the factors that are likely to determine the trade distorting effect of STEs 
or the consequences of partial reform. In a series of articles, we have investigated the potential 
consequences  of  STEs,  covering  both  importing/exporting  and  developed/developing 
countries and we draw upon this research as a means to provide insights into the potential 
consequences of COFCO on world markets and the likely effects of reform (McCorriston and 
MacLaren, 2005a,b; 2007a,b,c). 
State trading is essentially the manipulation of market structure to varying degrees to meet 
some (or a range of) government objective(s). Such manipulation in an open economy context 
clearly affects exporters who wish to gain market access to importing countries or who may face 
‗unfair‘ competition in export markets. Underlying our focus on the potential impact of state 
trading  on  world  markets,  we  measure  the  trade  distorting  effect  that  arises  from  this 
manipulation of market structure. The idea of a trade distorting equivalent measure can be 
related to earlier writing on state trading (notably Meade, 1955; and Lloyd, 1982) and to the 
focus of policymakers who draw the parallel that state trading acts in a manner similar to other 
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negotiators in the WTO. In light of this, we define the trade distorting equivalents of an STE as 
follows. For an importing country, the tariff equivalent of the STE is the tariff that would have 
to be paid to the given number of private firms (n) to achieve the same level of imports that 
arises with the STE. For an export country, the trade distorting effect of the STE is the export 
subsidy that would have to be paid to the private firms (n) that would achieve the same level of 
exports  as  that  by  the  STE.  These  tariff  and  subsidy  equivalent  effects  can  be  positive  or 
negative and we highlight below the factors that will likely determine the sign as well as the 
magnitude of these effects. Finally, this definition accords with the focus of the WTO definition 
of  STEs  that  relates  to  the  trade  effect  that  arises  from  them.  Specifically,  to  re-iterate  the 
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII (of GATT 1994) on STEs: 
‗Governmental  and  non-governmental  enterprises,  including  marketing  boards, 
which  have  been  granted  exclusive  or  special  rights  or  privileges,  including 
statutory or constitutional powers, in the exercise of which they influence through 
their  purchases  or  sales  the  level  or  direction  of  imports  or  exports‘  (WTO, 
1995:25). 
 
There  are  two  key  points  to  note  about  this  definition  and  how  they  relate  to  our 
framework.  First,  the  focus  is  on  exclusive  rights  not  ownership  –  the  designation  of  these 
exclusive rights can vary markedly across countries and commodity regimes. Second, it is the 
potential impact of these exclusive rights on market access and export competition that raises 
concerns about STEs (at least in the WTO context).1 
There are three key advantages that arise from these definitions of the trade distorting 
effects of STEs and the framework that is used to measure them. First, by focusing on the trade 
distorting effect, we have a readily identifiable measure of the potential effect of any particular 
STE. Second, the framework used is sufficiently flexible to allow different perceptions of the 
underlying benchmark to be addressed in a single model. For example, one of the many of the 
arguments used for sustaining the use of STEs is that the state marketing authority will be 
replaced by a small number of private firms that can exert oligopsonistic/oligopolistic power 
on suppliers and consumers. Indeed this has b een the outcome that has arisen after reform in 
many developing countries. Alternatively, others may argue that the presence of the STE 
prohibits the emergence of a competitive private sector and therefore that sustaining the use of 
                            
1  Of  course,  from  the  perspective  of  issues  of  domestic  de-regulation,  the  concern  about  STEs  may  relate  to  (i) 
efficiency of the STE relative to the role of private firms and/or (ii) the potential impact of the STE on re-distribution 
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the STE damages both domestic producers and consumers alike. We can be rather neutral on 
the issue of the underlying benchmark but allow it to account for different perceptions of the 
non-STE environments while addressing the trade distorting effect of STEs.  
Third,  an  important  point  to  remember  about  the  STE  landscape  is  that  STEs  are 
characterized by their heterogeneity. STEs not only differ in terms of geography (covering both 
developed and developing/emerging economies), agricultural importers as well as exporters, 
but also in terms of the exclusive rights that apply to them (see WTO definition above). In some 
cases, STEs have exclusive rights over domestic procurement and sales as well as trade; in other 
cases,  they  may  co-exist  with  private  firms  at  least  in  some  segment  of  the  market.  The 
framework that we have used can be employed to account for various patterns of exclusive 
rights that apply to STEs. Drawing on this research, we summarize briefly the key factors that 
will likely determine the trade distorting effect of STEs, both on the export and import side of 
world trade. 
The Competitiveness of the Underlying Benchmark: For simplicity, imagine an export 
country with a small number of private firms, greater than one, that can procure from domestic 
suppliers, and then sell the commodity on to domestic consumers and to the export market. In 
this case, the private firms can exert some degree of market power vis-à-vis consumers and 
buying power vis-à-vis farmers. But against this, and assuming the country to be ‗large‘, they 
may  not  be  able  to  take  full  advantage  of  the  potential  to  price  discriminate  between  the 
domestic and international markets which would be more effective with a single firm. Suppose 
now that an STE is imposed in this country and assume for present purposes that this STE has 
monopoly/monopsony  rights  in  both  the  domestic  and  export  market  and  it  is  profit 
maximizing. In this context, the STE can exert greater market power against both domestic 
producers and consumers and can more effectively price discriminate between the domestic 
and  export  markets.  Comparing  the  two  cases,  domestic  sales  go  down  and  domestic 
consumers pay higher prices. Whether exports increase will depend on the effect of the single 
firm in the procurement market and the allocation of this procurement between the domestic 
and export markets. If the impact of the STE is to reduce (increase) export sales, then its effect is 
equivalent to the case where the private firms are subject to an export tax (subsidy). 
Alternatively, suppose that the initial benchmark is characterized by a large number of 
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discriminate between the domestic and export market. If an STE is now imposed, the move 
from a competitive market to monopoly/monopsony will increase the degree of market power 
in the domestic market and provide more effective price discrimination between the domestic 
and export markets. However, the greater ability to price discriminate has to be outweighed by 
lower procurement in the domestic market. While the private firms cannot exert buying power, 
their procurement of the commodity will lead to larger export sales; the STE can exert buying 
power,  but  lower  procurement  may  reduce  export  sales.  So,  the  effect  of  the  STE  may  be 
equivalent to an export subsidy or a tax, the effect which arises being contingent on various 
parameters  of  the  market.  However,  this  comparison  is  restricted  to  the  case  of  a  profit 
maximizing STE. But as we note below, the size of this effect also depends on the objectives of 
the STE which may not necessarily be to maximize profits. 
An analogous case carries over to the import country. However, in this case, the STE is 
more  capable  of  fully  exploiting  the  potential  to  price  discriminate  in  the  procurement  of 
agricultural commodities between the domestic and import markets where in the latter market 
it can more effectively exploit the country's terms of trade effects assuming once again that the 
country  is  ‗large‘.  However,  as  above,  the  trade  distorting  effect  (in  this  case,  the  tariff 
equivalent) will depend on the marginal effect of the STE, i.e., relative to the characteristics of 
the  benchmark  that  one  would  expect  to  emerge  if  the  STE  did  not  exist.  But  unless  the 
underlying benchmark was characterized by a single private firm (in which case the marginal 
effect of the STE would be zero), the probable outcome is that the STE is equivalent to an import 
tariff. But this representation is too simplistic and the trade distorting effect of STEs will also 
depend on other factors that arise as we alter this simple model. 
The Nature of Exclusive Rights: In the above example, the STEs have rights to operate 
exclusively in both the domestic and the import/export market. But this is only true of some 
STEs. In many cases, the exclusive rights of the STE apply only to the export or import market 
while  the  domestic  market  is  characterized  by  the  existence  of  private  firms  (whether  in 
coexistence  with  the  STE  or  not).  This  characterization  has  an  important  bearing  on  the 
outcome.  For  example,  in  the  export  case,  the  STE  cannot  price  discriminate  between  the 
domestic  and  export  market  while, in the import  case,  the  STE  can  only  exploit  its  market 
power vis-à-vis purchases from the world market. This affects not only the size of the trade 
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distorting effect, i.e., the STE may be equivalent to an export tax or import subsidy. In fully 
addressing the size and sign of the trade distorting effect of any specific STE, the important 
point is that in capturing the nature of exclusive rights that apply to the STE, full account has to 
be taken of the interactions between the domestic and import/export markets, and the role of 
exclusive rights that apply (and therein the role of the private sector that may be allowed to 
coexist with the STE). 
The Objectives of the STE: Essentially STEs are instruments of government policy that are 
part  of  a  package  of  measures  used  to  meet  the  overall  objectives  of  the  government.  For 
example, and in fairly simplistic terms, in developed countries, the overall aim of government 
may be to increase the incomes of producers, while in developing/emerging economies, it may 
be to promote food security for consumers. In the context of state trading, the STE, even though 
it  may  be  a  single  entity  in  the  market,  may  not  necessarily  aim  to  maximize  profits.  This 
difference  from  a  private  firm  is  important  because,  while  we  can  reasonably  assume  that 
private  firms  aim  to  maximize  profits,  the  STE  may  maximize  a  (weighted)  social  welfare 
function  where  the  weights  reflect  the  overall  bias  of  government  policy  towards  domestic 
producers/consumers. This objective has an important bearing on the trade distorting effect of 
STEs since the relative weights on producer and consumer welfare will influence how much it 
procures and sells on the domestic market and hence its capability in ‗fully‘ price discriminating 
between the domestic and world markets and/or exploiting its terms of trade effects. So, for 
example, in the export case with exclusive rights on both the domestic and export markets, if we 
have a producer surplus maximizing STE, it will procure more from the domestic agricultural 
sector compared with a small number of private firms. Since it procures more but is still biased 
against the interests of domestic consumers, it will export relatively more to the world market.  
The combination of exclusive rights and the bias in the welfare function towards producers 
leads the STE to export ‗significantly‘ more to the world market. In this case, the export subsidy 
equivalent will be considerably higher relative to an uncompetitive benchmark. However, as 
the number of private firms in the benchmark increases, the export subsidy equivalent will fall 
as the higher amount of domestically procured output tends to the same level that a ‗high‘ 
number of domestic firms would procure. Taken together, the important point to note here is 
that  it  is  not  just  the  number  of  entities  that  compete  in  the  market  that  matters  but  also 
differences in the objectives between private firms and the STE. The departure from the sole MacLaren and McCorriston     Chap.8: Economic Effects of COFCO     167      
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motivation to maximize profits has an important bearing on the trade distorting effects of an 
STE. 
State Trading and Other Instruments of Government Policy:  Governments use an array 
of  instruments  to  meet  their  objectives  of  which  state  trading  may  be  only  one.  Indeed, 
reflecting  the  concerns  associated  with  state  trading,  while  economists  are  quite  capable  of 
measuring the distortions associated with more traditional policy instruments, state trading is 
less transparent and its effects more difficult to measure. But yet the effect of state trading 
depends  on  the  interaction  within  this  array  of  policy  instruments.  For  example,  if  the 
government uses a floor or guaranteed price to support farmers‘ incomes, this has a bearing on 
the trade distorting effect of an STE. To see this, assume we have the import country case, and 
that in the private sector benchmark, there are a small number of private firms. These firms 
have the potential to exploit producers. However, if the government employs a floor price, this 
essentially removes (or, more accurately, diminishes) the possibility of firms exerting market 
power. Thus the marginal effect of the STE (and hence the measure of the trade distorting effect 
that arises from this) will depend on what other instruments the government is employing. If 
the floor price also applies in the state trading environment, this too will affect the outcome as 
in this case, it raises the STE‘s procurement costs and its ability to price discriminate between 
the  domestic  and  export/import  markets.  In  sum,  it  is  not  just  the  competitiveness  of  the 
underlying benchmark that matters but also what else the government is likely to do (or does 
do) even if the STE were removed altogether. 
The Partial De-Regulation of STEs: As noted above, there is pressure both in the WTO 
context  and  domestically  across  many  countries  that  STEs  should  be  de-regulated.  At  face 
value, this pressure is often associated with the outright removal of STEs and full reliance on 
the private sector in domestic procurement and sales and trade. Yet, in many cases where the 
STE  has  been  de-regulated,  the  reforms  undertaken  have  typically  been  partial  in  nature. 
Reforms to state trading in Australia, China, Japan and Indonesia are a few key examples. Often 
when  de-regulation  occurs,  and  perhaps  reflecting  the  political  sensitivity  of  the  sectors  in 
which they operate, the reforms have often been associated with keeping the STE in place and 
instituting reforms that may include one or a combination of the following changes: changes to 
the nature of exclusive rights that apply to the STE; changing the objectives of the STE (e.g. 
becoming more focused on maximizing profits); allowing a greater role for the private sector MacLaren and McCorriston     Chap.8: Economic Effects of COFCO     168      
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but in combination with greater use of other policy instruments (e.g. removing the exclusive 
rights for the STE to procure in the domestic market but using floor prices also, or using import 
tariffs). There are two issues that arise from this: first, de-regulating the role of the STE may 
change the size (even direction) of the trade distorting effect associated with it; and second, 
such partial de-regulation may not necessarily be welfare enhancing. 
To highlight some of these effects, consider Figures 1 and 2 below. Here we calibrate the 
theoretical  models  used  elsewhere  with  assumed  values for  the  parameters  to  illustrate the 
various effects discussed above. In Figure 1, we highlight the case of the importing country and 
consider the effects of the private firm benchmark, the nature of the welfare function of the STE, 
the nature of exclusive rights and the role of domestic price support. The definition of the tariff 









Figure 1: Tariff Equivalent of an STE with Varying 
Exclusive Rights and Objectives
SD, WM SD, PB IO, PB IO, PB, PS
 
SD,WM: single desk STE with joint exclusive rights and welfare maximizing 
SD, PB: single desk STE with joint exclusive rights and producer surplus maximizing 
IO, PB: import rights only and producer surplus maximizing 
IO,PB,PS: import rights only, producer surplus maximizing and domestic price support 
te: specific tariff equivalent  
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Consider, first of all, the bottom line (denoted SD, WM) which represents the case where 
we have an STE which aims to maximize social (not interest group) welfare and the STE has 
sole rights in the domestic (both sales and procurement) and over imports.2 The figure shows 
that compared with a small number of private firms, the effect of the STE would be equivalent 
to an import subsidy, i.e., the STE would import more than would have arisen with a highly 
imperfectly competitive benchmark. The assumption of a welfare maximizing STE is, however, 
unrealistic as most governments tend to direct agricultural policy to certain  groups. In the 
figure,  we  therefore  show  the  effect  of  an  STE  that  reflects  a  government  bias  towards 
producers. This is the assumption that characterizes all of the three additional lines in Figure 1. 
Since they all lie above the  x-axis, they highlight that the trade distorting effect of the STE is 
equivalent to an import tariff. In other words, the presence of the STE reduces market access. 
Note the factors that will likely determine the size of this tariff equivalent effect. First, as the 
underlying benchmark becomes more competitive (n rises), the trade distorting effect of the STE 
increases in all cases. Second, the magnitude of the trade distorting effect for a given n will 
depend on the characterization of exclusive rights. The two cases considered here are where the 
STE has exclusive rights over imports and domestic procurement and sales (denoted SD, PB) 
and,  alternatively,  where  the  STE  has  exclusive  rights  over  imports  but  competes  with  the 
private sector in the domestic market (denoted IO, PB). With the data used for this example, the 
presence  of  the  private  sector  increases  the  trade  distorting  effect  of  the  STE  albeit  only 
marginally.  Finally, when  the  government  uses  an  additional  instrument  (in  this  case  price 
support),  the  trade  distorting  effect  due  to  the  presence  of  the  STE  falls  significantly  (line 
denoted IO, PB, PS). Taken together, the figure highlights that while a state trading enterprise 
has the potential to affect market access in a manner similar to a more traditional import tariff, 
the magnitude of this effect will depend on a range of offsetting factors. 
Figure 2 reports the results of a similar exercise this time focusing on the trade distorting 
effect of an STE involved in the export market. Here we consider four cases, one where we have 
a welfare maximizing STE with exclusive rights in both the domestic and export markets and, in 
the  other  three  cases,  where  we  assume  that  the  STE's  objective  is  biased  towards  raising 
producer welfare. First, the STE has joint exclusive rights over exports, domestic procurement 
and domestic sales (labeled as SD, WM); second, where the same set of exclusive rights apply 
                            
2 SD refers to single desk which we use to refer to the STE that has exclusive rights in both the domestic markets and 
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but where the objective of the government is biased towards producers (labeled SD, PB); third, 
where the STE‘s objective is biased towards producers but the STE has exclusive rights over 
exports only and coexists with the private sector and where the private sector accounts for sales 
to domestic consumers (labeled as LF, PB)3; and finally, where the STE has joint exclusive rights 
in the domestic and export markets, the STE‘s objective is to increase producer welfare but the 
government also uses price support (labeled as SD, PB, PS). As is evident from the figure, the 
trade  distorting  effect  of  the  STE  may  be  positive  or  negative.  Specifically,  when  the  state 
trading enterprise has joint rights and there is no other government intervention, the trade 
distorting effect of the STE is similar to an export subsidy with the size of this export subsidy 
being greater when the underlying market structure is less competitive. However, the presence 
of the price support turns the effect of the STE to be equivalent to an export tax, i.e., the STE 
with price support would export less than the private sector with price support. Finally, the 
trade distorting effect of an STE that has exclusive rights over exports only would serve to act in 
a manner equivalent to an export tax. Taken together, the figure highlights the importance of 
the  interaction  between  exclusive  rights,  the  use  of  other  government  instruments  and  the 
assumptions about the competitiveness of the underlying market structure. 
Finally, in both the import and export cases, it is possible that the government's objective 
function may be biased towards consumers. This possibility will make the trade distorting effect 
lie between the welfare maximizing and producer biased cases: in the import case, giving rise to 
a possible import subsidy effect and, in the export case, giving rise to an export tax effect. In 
essence, as the weight on producer welfare decreases but that on consumer welfare increases, 
the  trade  distorting  effects  turn  from  an  import  tariff/export  subsidy  to  an  import 
subsidy/export tax. The case of a profit maximizing STE lies between these two effects and 
could give rise to either of these effects contingent on other aspects of the environment in which 
they operate (e.g., the use of domestic price support policies). Note that the sign of the trade 
distorting effect will give some indication of the likely consequences to (competing) exporters. 
In the import case, if the trade distorting effect is negative, then market access increases because 
of  the  STE;  in  the  export  case,  a  negative  export  subsidy  also  implies  gains  to  competing 
                            
3 LF refers to the use of licensed firms. Note, that there may be more than one licensed firm and we would still be 
consistent with the WTO definition of a state trading enterprise. In the case that we report in the figure, we restrict LF 
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exporters from the existence of the STE. However, a positive import tariff will reduce market 








Figure 2: Export Subsidy Equivalent of an STE with Varying 
Exclusive Rights and Objectives
SD,WM SD, PB SD,PB,PS LF, PB
 
SD,WM: single desk with joint exclusive rights and welfare maximizing 
SD, PB: single desk with joint exclusive rights and producer surplus maximizing 
SD,PB, PS: single desk with joint exclusive rights, producer surplus maximizing and domestic price 
support 
LF, PB: licensed firm(s) and producer surplus maximizing 
se: specific export subsidy equivalent 
 
Taken  together,  this  discussion  draws  out  the  main  characteristics  to  consider  when 
determining  the  effect  of  state  trading  enterprises  on  world  markets.  Furthermore,  it  gives 
important insights into what to look for in measuring the potential impact of any specific STE. 
Therefore,  we  use  this  framework  to  investigate  the  potential  effect  of  COFCO  on  world 
markets. Before doing so, we provide an overview of the major developments in the use of state 
trading  in  China  and  summarize  the  principal  changes  brought  about  following  China's 
accession to the WTO in 2001. 
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The Role of State Trading in China 
The use of state trading in China has its origins in the central planning of the Chinese economy 
since 1949. With central planning, all foreign trade was controlled, with exports and imports set 
to meet annual plans, the overall objective of these plans being to promote self-sufficiency. 
Although there have been recent changes to the involvement of the state in international trade, 
the  use  of  STEs  and,  even  though  the  reliance  of  state  trading  particularly  with  respect  to 
agricultural trade came under focus in China‘s accession negotiations to the WTO, state trading 
still dominates the policy landscape for agricultural imports and exports.  
Under central planning, the China National Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs Import and Export 
Corporation (CEROILS) had almost complete control over the main agricultural imports and 
exports. Now known as COFCO, the purpose of this organization was to balance domestic 
supply and demand through the management of exports and imports, to promote food security, 
to  stabilize  prices  and  generally  to  meet  the  government‘s  objectives  with  regard  to  the 
agricultural sector.4,5 The determination of the level of imports and exports arises via a complex 
hierarchical process, with COFCO essentially acting as the agent over trade volumes and prices 
for decisions taken elsewhere. In essence, the State Planning and Development Commission 
(SPDC),  in  consultation  with  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Trade  and  Economic  Cooperation 
(MOFTEC)  and  the  State  Council  determine  the  level  of  import  requirements  and  volumes 
available  for  export,  having  consulted  with  central  and  regional  authorities  on  domestic 
requirements. However, to ensure imports and exports met with the requirements of the central 
planning process, COFCO was given exclusive rights over imports and exports, which in turn 
gave it monopsony and monopoly power over Chinese agricultural trade.6  
Although the state plays a dominant role in trade, state in volvement has also been a key 
characteristic of the domestic marketing environment vis-à-vis the government‘s Grain Bureau 
which exerted control over procurement and distribution in the marketing of grain which, in 
turn,  identified  grain  availability  and  requirements  across  Chinese  provinces.  Over  the  last 
decade or so, there have been a series of reforms (at times reducing the role of the state, at 
                            
4 It should be noted that COFCO is a highly-diversified company with investments in hotel and leisure facilities, real 
estate, agro-industrialized projects as well as investments abroad as part of its overall portfolio. 
5 The objectives and use of state trading have been reiterated under the Foreign Trade Law (2004). Specifically, the 
state may subject certain goods to state trading to ensure stable domestic supply, to stabilize prices, to safeguard food 
safety, and to protect the environment and exhaustible resources. 
6 Note that while for a period licensed firms could also be involved in exports,  the allocation of export licenses was 
determined centrally and it still fitted with the definition of a state trading enterprise since the use of licensed firms 
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others increasing it), but the state continues to play an important role in the domestic market 
despite more recently the potential for non-state firms to participate in the procurement and 
marketing of grain. As discussed below, attempts to increase the presence of non-state firms in 
international trade of agricultural commodities has also been a feature of recent developments 
following China‘s accession to the WTO. 
The  dominant  role  of  COFCO  in  agricultural  trade  extends  over  a  number  of  key 
commodities. On the import side, COFCO has had exclusive rights to import grains (wheat, 
maize and rice), vegetable oils (soybean, palm, canola, and mustard) and sugar. As part of the 
WTO  Accession  Protocol,  some  diminution  of  these  exclusive  rights  has  arisen  with  the 
allocation of some portion of the tariff arte quotas (TRQs) (introduced in 1996) to non-state 
firms.  7,8  On  the  export  side,  COFCO  has  exclusive  rights  over  rice,  maize  and  soybeans. 
Though,  for  a  period,  the  administration  of  export  licenses  permitted  non-state  firms  to 
participate in the exports of key commodities, this licensing process has been rescinded with 
COFCO now having exclusive rights over exports. Taken together, COFCO dominates China‘s 
agricultural exports and imports and as such has the potential to impact on market access and 
to affect competition on export markets. It should be noted in passing that state trading in China 
covers  (or  has  covered)  a  wide  range  of  agricultural  and  non-agricultural  commodities 
including  tea,  tobacco,  cotton,  silk,  oil,  peanuts,  petroleum,  coal  and  chemical  fertilizers, 
tungsten ore, antimony and silver. 
 To give some impression of the importance of COFCO in China‘s international trade, Table 
1 reports average values for imports and exports of the key agricultural commodities controlled 
by COFCO as listed above for the period 1990-2005. The importance of COFCO is particularly 
obvious  for  exports  and  imports  of  grain  especially wheat  and  rice  imports  and  exports  of 
maize.9  For  some  state  traded  commodities,  the  share  of  China‘s  imports  and  exports  can 
account for a significant proportion of world trade in specific commodity markets. For example, 
                            
7 The guaranteed access to the quotas for the state trading enterprises varies across commodities as we highlight 
below. Most commodities are subject only to an ad valorem tariff.  For example, for feed grains (including barley) the 
rates average around 3%, for vegetables around 10%, for fruits around 11% and for dairy products around 10%. For 
meat products, the bound rates are somewhat higher, being between 12% and 20% for beef and for pig-meat, and 
15% for lamb (ABARE 2006). 
8 For the within-quota imports, the tariff is generally low and of ‗nuisance‘ value while the out-of-quota tariff is 
generally prohibitive. For example, on wheat imports, the within-tariff quota is 1%; the out-of-quota tariff is 65%. As 
such, we largely set aside the role of tariffs in discussion of imports where state trading predominates. 
9 The average values for the imports of palm oil are particularly high due to substantial increases in th e value of 
imports between 2002 and 2005, which considerably exceeded the average values for the period 1990 to 2002. MacLaren and McCorriston     Chap.8: Economic Effects of COFCO     174      
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the value of China‘s wheat imports in 1991-92 accounted for around 14% of world imports of 
wheat. In 2002, China‘s maize exports accounted for around 20% of total world maize exports. 
What is not so obvious from these data is the volatility of Chinese exports and imports for key 
agricultural  commodities.  Indeed,  this  is  often  one  of  the  criticisms  that  is  leveled  at  state 
trading regimes, i.e., they are disruptive of international markets given that purchases and sales 
can  vary  significantly  from  one  year  to  the  next,  an  outcome  which  reflects  the  lack  of 
transparency  associated  with  central  planning  and  the  dominance  of  meeting  domestic 
objectives  where  international  trade  acts  as  a  residual  to  balance  any  domestic  supply  and 
demand imbalance. 
 
Table 1: Annual Average Value of Chinese Agricultural Imports  
and Exports Controlled by State Trading: 1990-2005 (US$ 000) 
 
Commodity  Imports  Exports 
Wheat  769,134   
Rice  131,978  205,770 
Maize    779,366 
Soybeans    122,389 
Soybean Oil  539,779   
Palm Oil  750,747   
Sugar  36,467   
         Source: FAO 
 
This  volatility  of  the  volume  of  exports  and  imports  is  evident  from  Figure  3  which 
highlights  the  level  of  imports  of  wheat  and  exports  of  maize  over  the  period  1990-2005. 
Reflecting  this  volatility,  the  impact  of  China  on  world  markets  can  vary  markedly.  For 
example, though China‘s wheat imports accounted for around 14% of world wheat imports 
over the period 1991-92, between 2003 and 2005 this share had fallen to around 3-4%of world 
wheat imports. For China‘s maize exports, the effect seems more variable. In 1991-92, maize 
exports from China accounted for 20% of world maize exports, but the year after they had fallen 
to 2% of world maize exports. Similar patterns of variability can be found in recent years: in 
2005, China‘s maize exports accounted for 5% of world maize exports, down from a 20% share 
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Given  the  dominant  role  played  by  COFCO  in  Chinese  agricultural  trade  for  major 
commodities, it is of no surprise that state trading was an important issue in the negotiations 
concerning China‘s accession to the WTO in the late 1990s. The intended outcome was to ensure 
that the activities of state trading enterprises were consistent with GATT Article XVII, with the 
Accession Protocol stating: 
1.  China  shall  ensure  that  import  purchasing  procedures  of  state  trading 
enterprises  are  fully  transparent,  and  in  compliance  with  the  WTO 
Agreement, and shall refrain from taking any measure to influence or direct 
state trading enterprises as to the quantity, value, or country of origin of 
goods purchased or sold, except in accordance with the WTO Agreement. 
 
2.  As part of China's notification under the GATT 1994 and the Understanding 
on  the  Interpretation  of  Article  XVII  of  the  GATT  1994,  China  shall  also 
provide  full  information  on  the  pricing  mechanisms  of  its  state  trading 
enterprises for exported goods. (WTO, 2001, p. 5) 
 
As part of the accession process, China agreed to relinquish part of the TRQs to non-state-
firms.  The  aim  of  this  was  to  reduce  the  dominance  of  COFCO  across  various  commodity 
sectors, the specific mechanism being to allocate a specified share (but less than 100%) of the 
TRQ to COFCO. The agreed shares of imports to be allocated are: 90% for wheat, 71–60%for 
maize, 50%for rice, 42–10% for vegetable oils, 70% for sugar 33% for cotton and zero% for wool 
(WTO, 2001, Schedule CLII, Part I, Section 1–B, p. 61-66). However, it should be noted that the MacLaren and McCorriston     Chap.8: Economic Effects of COFCO     176      
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allocation of a share of the TRQ does not necessarily imply a significant privatization of the 
import regime as the non-state firms still have to acquire licenses from the SDPC and there are 
conditions  on  the  firms  that  would  qualify  for  such  licenses.  These  conditions  relate  to 
minimum levels of capital, the potential to import beyond a certain threshold, a suitable bank 
credit rating and a satisfactory level of profitability. With the allocation of import licenses and 
the continued dominance of COFCO over imports, it is clear that state trading still appears as a 
significant feature of China‘s agricultural trade policy. As such, while recent changes may have 
affected the level of trade distorting that may arise from COFCO it is clearly the case that 
COFCO still has the potential to significantly distort agricultural trade.  
With  regard  to  exports,  recent  changes  have  reinforced  the  dominant  role  of  COFCO. 
Between 1990 and 2004, an export licensing and quota regime applied to certain commodities 
including rice, maize, tea, cotton, silk and soybean meal. However, under the terms of the WTO 
Accession  Protocol,  export  licensing  was  phased  out,  with  the  controlled  goods  remaining 
subject  to  the  state  trading  regime,  and  with  the  Accession  Protocol  confirming  the  use  of 
COFCO in the management of exports for certain ‗strategic‘ commodities. 
The Trade Distorting Impact of COFCO 
In  this  section,  we  report  some  results  from  our  recent  research  that  focuses  directly  on 
measuring  the  trade  distorting  impact  of  COFCO  on  world  markets  (McCorriston  and 
MacLaren, 2007a, d). This research analyzes the effects of the leading STE-exported commodity 
(maize) to the world market and the leading STE-imported commodity (wheat). The focus is on 
the current regime as it emerged from the WTO Accession Protocol though, in the paper from 
which we draw these results, we also highlight how the trade distorting effect of COFCO may 
have changed following reforms in the grain sector in China since the late-1990s. The earlier 
discussion  gives  some  pointers  as  to  what  we  should  be  looking  at  to  measure  the  trade 
distorting effect and what challenges may lie in dealing explicitly with the trade regime as 
applied in China. These pointers are the bias in the government‘s welfare function reflecting the 
bias in agricultural policy, the characterization of exclusive rights (and related to this the role of 
the  non-state  sector)  and  other  mechanisms  the  government  may  use  to  influence  the 
commodity market. We also assume that wheat prices at the procurement stage are flexible in 
that  there  is  no  pre-determined  level  for  what  the  price  at  the  farm  gate  should  be.  This 
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price that farmers would receive for grain and a quota to be delivered to the state sector via the 
Grain Bureaus. 
With respect to the bias of agricultural policy, it is of course difficult to attach a precise 
weight or measure to this. As noted above, the use of state trading in China reflects a range of 
objectives including food security, ensuring food supplies and stabilizing markets. However, it 
appears that in recent years, the bias of agricultural policy in China has tilted towards favoring 
producers. This is reflected in recent Producer Support Equivalent (PSE) measures for China. In 
the mid-1990s, the aggregate PSE measures were negative reflecting a bias towards consumers; 
more recently, the bias has switched to producers with the average PSE measure now positive. 
However, for wheat the PSE (CSE) is negative (positive) though for maize, the PSE (CSE) is 
positive (negative). Reflecting this, we assume a ‗mild‘ bias towards consumers (producers) for 
the wheat (maize) sectors in the results we derive below. 
Modeling  the  nature  of  exclusive  rights  and  the  role  of  the  private  sector  poses  some 
challenges for addressing issues in the wheat sector. There are three aspects of this that need to 
be considered. First, the reforms in the wheat marketing sector in recent years have allowed for 
non-state enterprises to procure and distribute domestically produced wheat. Moreover, given 
the nature of these enterprises, their objective function will likely differ from that of COFCO as, 
not  being  explicit  instruments  of  government  policy,  their  interests  will  lie  in  maximizing 
profits. Second, the mechanics of the TRQ system under the WTO Accession Protocol allocates a 
share of the TRQ away from COFCO. As noted in the discussion above, to qualify for an import 
license, the enterprise has to fulfill certain criteria. This potentially differentiates them from non-
state enterprises in the domestic market that will not qualify or not be allocated a license for 
whatever reason. To capture this, we differentiate these licensed firms (which can still procure 
from the domestic market) from those that can only participate in the domestic but not import 
market. Therefore, in our set-up, we have three types of enterprises that co-exist: the non-state 
domestic enterprises; the licensed firms that can procure from the domestic market and imports; 
and the state sector that plays a role in the domestic market and via COFCO which acts as the 
agent in procuring and distributing imports. 
However,  there  is  a  third  issue  which  we  attempt  to  incorporate,  namely,  the 
administration  of  import  licenses  in  the  presence  of  COFCO  and  the  hierarchical  nature  of 
decision  making  in  China.  One  aspect  of  the  hierarchical  decision-making  is  that  the  State MacLaren and McCorriston     Chap.8: Economic Effects of COFCO     178      
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Development  and  Planning  Council,  determines  jointly  the  level  of  imports  and  domestic 
procurement.  This  captures  the  idea  that  COFCO‘s  purchases  are  not  independent  of  the 
decisions made by the SDPC in determining requirements in the domestic market. When it 
comes to the import licenses of the non-state firms, once given a license, they freely determine 
how much to import to maximize profits which is contingent on their decisions in the domestic 
wheat sector. The alternative to this scenario is one involving a more subtle way of modeling 
the imports of non-state firms. Specifically, since the state allocates these licenses and as the 
share of the TRQ that is specifically allocated between the non-state enterprises and COFCO has 
already been determined, the non-state firms are not free to import how much they choose, as 
they have already been allocated some proportion of the total quota and therefore related to 
what the SDPC would determine. As such, if they import, the license determines how much 
they will import and the profit maximizing decision in the domestic market takes the import 
allocation as given. As we show below, characterizing the decision process in this way has an 
important effect on determining the trade distorting effect of COFCO. 
Details  of  the  data  used  to  calibrate  the  model  and  the  assumptions  regarding  the 
competitiveness  of  the  underlying  benchmark  can  be  found  in  McCorriston  and  MacLaren 
(2007d). In brief, the model was calibrated using wheat sector data for 2005/06. We assumed 
that China has some degree of market power in procuring imports, i.e., it is a large country in 
the international wheat market. Domestic and imported wheat are assumed to be relatively 
homogeneous  and  that  the  underlying  private  sector  benchmark  was  fairly  but  not  ‗too‘ 
competitive.10 
Table 2 reports the results for the potential trade distorting effect of COFCO in the world 
wheat market. The two cases reported reflect the different   assumptions about the decision -
making process and the impact that this has on the imports of the licensed enterprises. It is clear 
that, whatever assumption is used, the tariff equivalent effect of COFCO is negative, reporting 
an import subsidy equivalent as high as US$29 per tonne in the restricted case, which is around 
14% of the world price for that year. The non -restricted case reports a lower import subsidy 
equivalent: although the licensed firms can potentially import more under this ‗unrestricted‘ 
regime, total imports are lower as, in this case, we have to account for the strategic interaction 
between COFCO and the licensed firms (and also between the latter) that would not otherwise 
                            
10  In  the  framework  we  use,  all  these  assumptions  can  be  readily  varied.  The  sensitivity  of  the  results  to  these 
assumptions can be found in McCorriston and MacLaren (2007d). MacLaren and McCorriston     Chap.8: Economic Effects of COFCO     179      
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exist in the ‗restricted‘ regime. Varying the assumptions used in calibrating the model does not 
change the overall picture even though it changes the magnitude of the tariff equivalent. More 
important is the assumption of the bias in government policy. Reflecting the PSE/CSE values 
for China in the wheat sector, we have assumed a bias towards consumers. However, switching 
the  bias  towards  producers  and  away  from  consumers  would  result  in  a  positive  tariff 
equivalent equal to US$316 per tonne. The overall conclusion is that COFCO distorts market 
access, the magnitude of this effect is potentially significant, and the impact of COFCO on the 
world wheat market reflects the bias in government policies. 
 
Table 2: Trade Distorting Impact of COFCO in the Wheat Market 
 
Tariff Equivalent Effect   
     -restricted case  -$US 28.9/tonne 
 
     -non-restricted case  $US17.8/tonne 
   
China: net welfare effect1    
     -restricted case  0.12 
     -non-restricted case  0.43 
   
Exporters‘ welfare1   
    -restricted case  16.1 
    -non-restricted case  9.8 
   
1 Percentage change from private firm benchmark 
 
All trade distortions affect welfare and the same is true of state trading. Table 2 therefore 
reports the welfare effects associated with the trade distorting effect of COFCO. There are two 
main results to note. First, in the restricted case, net welfare for China is slightly increased (by 
0.12%) compared with what would have arisen if COFCO did not exist. This increase reflects 
the increase in consumer surplus which is associated with the increase in imports arising from 
the import subsidy equivalent. In addition, reflecting the negative trade distorting effect and 
therefore the increase in market access associated with it, welfare for exporters is higher (by 
16%) compared with the private firm benchmark. Second, in the unrestricted case, net welfare 
in China is higher by 0.43% and exporters' welfare higher by around 10% the latter reflecting MacLaren and McCorriston     Chap.8: Economic Effects of COFCO     180      
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the relatively lower negative tariff equivalent effect.11 Note that driving the sign of the trade 
distorting effect and therefore the implications for  welfare in China and that of third country 
exporters is the bias of government policies. If the bias of these policies were to change to favor 
producers, the trade distorting effect would change sign resulting in a positive trade distorting 
effect, restricted market access, lower welfare for exporters and net welfare benefits for China. 
Of course, as with all trade instruments, the net welfare effects hide the internal re -distributive 
effects which are substantial.12 
 
Table 3: Trade Distorting Effect of COFCO in the Maize Market 
 
Subsidy equivalent effect  US$14.2/tonne 
   
China: net welfare effect1  -5.4  
   
Competing exporters‘ welfare1  -0.3  
   
Importers‘ welfare1  23.6  
   
1 Percentage change from private firm benchmark 
 
Finally,  Table  3  reports  results  from  McCorriston  and  MacLaren  (2007a)  relating  to 
COFCO's  presence  in  the world  maize  market.  Reflecting  the  positive  (negative) PSE (CSE) 
measures in the Chinese maize sector, we assume a bias in the welfare towards producers. 
Resulting from this, the subsidy equivalent is positive amounting to around 13% of the world 
price. This is clearly a significant subsidy equivalent effect which affects competing exporters. 
Reflecting this, their welfare falls by  –0.3% while net welfare for China also falls by  –5.4%. 
Importing countries would nevertheless benefit from this positive subsidy equivalent, welfare 
in the importing countries rising by around 23%.13 
Taken together, these results relating to the use of state trad ing in China confirm that  in 
both import and export markets COFCO has a significant potential to distort trade. However, 
the extent to which it does so and, in turn, the impact this has on welfare in China and in the 
                            
11 Note that the net welfare effects for China include the re-distribution between producers, marketing firms‘ profits 
and  consumers  while,  for  the  exporting  countries  affected  by  the  tariff  equivalent,  we  assume  no  domestic 
consumption. 
12 We report a larger array of results including the effects on producers, consumers and profits in McCorriston and 
MacLaren (2007d). 
13 Again, this relatively large figure reflects no net domestic transfers where the gains to one group are diluted by the 
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rest of the world will reflect China‘s priorities with respect to the direction of its agricultural 
policy objectives and the role that China plays in world markets. The hierarchical nature of 
decision-making in China also has an important bearing in addressing the impact of COFCO on 
world markets. 
Finally, there are three important caveats to bear in mind when reviewing the results. First, 
these results are indicative of the potential of COFCO to distort agricultural markets, rather 
than being definitive. But the framework does highlight the factors that will determine these 
effects. Second, the evidence from the OECD data on PSE measures suggests the bias in Chinese 
agricultural policy has been changing in recent years. Given that the bias in the welfare function 
is one of the key determinants of the impact of state trading, on-going developments in the 
direction of policy objectives of the central government in China will have an important bearing 
on the effect of COFCO on international markets. Finally, as is evident from Figure 3, China‘s 
imports and exports from the world market are highly variable between years, reflecting among 
other factors variability in domestic supply and demand imbalance. As such, one should expect 
the potential impact of COFCO on world markets to also vary significantly from year to year. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The  use  of  state  trading  in  China  in  the  form  of  COFCO  has  been  a  key  feature  of  the 
agricultural policy landscape in China for many years and as such is an important instrument 
for  the  Chinese  government  in  managing  commodity  markets  and  meeting  its  overall 
objectives.  Given  the  prevalence  of  state  trading  and  the  impact  China  can  have  on  world 
markets, it was of no surprise that the use of state trading was an important issue in China‘s 
accession  negotiations  to  the  WTO.  State  trading  nevertheless  persists  for  key  agricultural 
commodities and applies to both imports and exports. Despite attempts in the WTO Accession 
Protocol  to  limit  (or  diminish)  the  influence  of  state  trading,  COFCO  still  has  significant 
potential to control both imports and exports of several commodities. 
In general, there is an absence of theoretical work that formally addresses the impact of 
STEs  on  world  markets.  In  this  paper,  we  have  drawn  on  some  of  our  recent  research  to 
highlight the factors that are likely to influence the effects that STEs have on world markets. We 
have recently extended this body of research to deal with some of the explicit issues that arise 
with respect to COFCO including aspects that specifically relate to the WTO Accession Protocol. 
Our results confirm more casual expectations that COFCO does have the potential to distort MacLaren and McCorriston     Chap.8: Economic Effects of COFCO     182      
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world markets and, in turn, welfare for both China and other countries. In large part, the sign of 
this trade distorting effect will reflect the overall bias in Chinese agricultural policy towards 
producers and consumers as well as the terms of trade effects that arise due to China‘s size on 
commodity markets. In sum, the manipulation of market structure via the use of state trading is 
just another instrument of government policy, albeit one which requires a different focus to 
measure the trade distorting and welfare effects that arise from it. Nevertheless, the impact of 
state trading enterprises on trade is at least as significant, if not more so, than that of the more 
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